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INTRODUCTION
In July 2020, Kazakhstan’s second president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev
announced that the country’s agricultural land “is not for sale to foreigners.” 1
In May 2021, Tokayev signed into law an amendment to the country’s Land
Code banning the sale of agricultural land to “foreign citizens, stateless
persons, foreign legal entities, Kazakhstani legal entities with foreign
owners, international organizations, academic centers involved with foreign
countries.” 2 Tokayev’s actions seem to conflict with Kazakhstan’s other
policies favoring foreign investors. The country has attempted to attract
foreign capital and technology by highlighting Kazakhstan’s natural
resources, educated work force, and “vast arable lands.” 3 And investors have
heeded the call. In 2019, Kazakhstan succeeded in attracting over $3 billion
in foreign direct investment (FDI) and $330 billion total FDI since achieving
independence in 1991. 4 FDI plays a central role in the government’s strategy
to diversify the country’s oil-and-gas-dependent economy. 5 Only one month
after its president declared farmland to be “not for sale to foreigners,” the
country invited foreign business to profit from Kazakhstan’s “cheap and
plentiful” electricity in mining cryptocurrency at the new Enegix facility. 6
Tokayev’s ban mars this investor-friendly picture.
While potentially deterring foreign investors, the ban has a clear popular
Prodazha Zemli Inostrantsam: Tokaev Prinial Reshenie [Sale of Land to Foreigners:
Tokayev Has Decided], FORBES.KZ (July 10, 2020), https://forbes.kz/process/budut_li_
peredavatsya_kazahstanskie_zemli_inostrantsam/, (“Zemlia ne budet prodavat’sia
inostrantsam.” (author’s translation in text above)).
2
Tokaev Podpisal Zakon, Zapreshchaiushchii Prodazhu Zelm’i Inostrantsam [Tokayev
Signs Law Forbidding Sale of Land to Foreigners], https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_
news/tokaev-podpisal-zakon-zapreschayuschiy-prodaju-zemli-437231/ (May 13, 2021)
(author’s translation in text above); O Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopol’nenii v Nekotorye
Zakonodatel’nye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam Zemel’nykh Otnoshenii [An Act
to Change and Amend Several Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Issues of Land
Relations] art. 1(6) (May 13, 2021).
3
E.g., Nursultan Nazarbayev, Strategy “Kazakhstan 2030” in Prosperity, Security and
Ever Growing Welfare of All The Kazakhstanis, Message of the President of The Country to
The People of Kazakhstan, https://www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/strategies_and_
programs (highlighting “geographical position on the very crossroads in the Eurasian region,”
“rich natural resources,” “a highly educated population with . . . scientific and creative
potential,” and “our vast land areas, our arable lands” as advantages in economic growth for
the country).
4
See Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows - Kazakhstan 1992-2019, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?end=2019&locations=KZ&sta
rt=1992&view=chart (last visited Mar. 8, 2021); Dilshat Zhussupova, Kazakhstan Attracts
$330 Billion FDI Since 1991, ASTANA TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://astanatimes.com/
2019/09/kazakhstan-attracts-330-billion-fdi-since-1991/.
5
Nazarbayev, supra note 3 (“Further rehabilitation of the economy depends on a massive
influx of investments.”).
6
Paddy Baker, Bitcoin Mining Facility with Room for 50,000 Rigs Set to Launch in
Kazakhstan, NASDAQ COINDESK (Aug. 21, 2020 12:24PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/
bitcoin-mining-facility-with-room-for-50000-rigs-set-to-launch-in-kazakhstan-2020-08-21.
1
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audience within Kazakhstan. 7 The privatization of agricultural land remains
controversial in the post-Soviet country, and extraterritorial influence in the
land market only heightens existing tensions. 8 In 2016, a government
commission proposed several reforms to the country’s Land Code that
would, among other provisions, allow foreign-controlled entities to lease
farmland for up to twenty-five years. 9 This proposed legislation was met with
mass protests across the country—unusual levels of popular expression in
this undemocratic country 10—to which the government responded by
imposing a moratorium on the privatization of farmland until the end of
2021. 11 It was this moratorium that Tokayev codified in May 2021.
This article will examine how we can make sense of Kazakhstan’s
restrictions on FDI in agricultural land, and why this topic is an exception to
the country’s otherwise FDI-centered development strategy. I hope thereby
to explore the domestic and international pressures shaping Kazakhstani 12
law. To this end, the article will also compare Kazakhstan’s legal regime with
New Zealand’s restriction on the purchase of housing by foreign persons in
the 2018 Overseas Investment Act. Borrowing from the lexicon of
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part V.C.
9
See Zemel’nyi Kodeks Respubliki Kazakhstan [Land Code] [hereinafter Land Code]
art. 24. This article will cite official Russian-language versions of the Civil and Land Codes,
which have been enacted as law. Russian has official legal status on par with Kazakh-language
laws. Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan (1995 rev. 2017) [Konst. RK] [Constitution] art. 7
para. 2 (“Russian language shall be officially used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh
language in state institutions.”). To avoid reinventing the wheel for translation, this article will
use the unofficial English version of the Civil and Land Codes provided by Adilet, a legal
research system hosted by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice.
10 Kazakhstan is rated “not free” by Freedom House, with freedom of assembly subject
to “tight restrictions.” These include denial of permits for “sanctioned” protests, the arrest of
protesters and those supporting non-sanctioned protests on social media. Kazakhstan,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2020 (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
The popular protests of January 2022 against fuel prices and continuing demonstrations
against the Tokayev regime’s deadly crackdown may complicate this picture. See, e.g., “I
Don’t Know if She’s Dead or Alive”: Desperate Kazakh Families Looking for Relatives After
Unrest, RADIOFREEEUROPE (Jan. 20, 2022, 12:47 PM), https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstandeadly-unrest-missing-relatives/31663308.html.
11 See Land Code art. 24; Aiman Turebekova, Kazakhstan Extends by Five Years
Moratorium on Controversial Land Code Amendments, ASTANA TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://astanatimes.com/2016/08/kazakhstan-extends-by-five-years-moratorium-oncontroversial-land-code-amendments/#:~:text=Kazakhstan%20Extends%20by%20Five%20
Years%20Moratorium%20on%20Controversial%20Land%20Code%20Amendments,-By
%20Aiman%20Turebekova&text=ASTANA%20%E2%80%93%20Kazakhstan%20decided
%20Aug.,amendments%20to%20its%20land%20law.
12 The term “Kazakhstani” denotes places or practices of the country as a whole, and the
demonym “Kazakh” refers to the ethnic group after which the country is named. Kazakhstan
is a multinational country and multilingual country, so it is useful to draw a distinction
between nationality and ethnicity. People and Society (Kazakhstan), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kazakhstan/#people-and-society
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2021).
7
8
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international trade, I will use the term “protectionism” to refer to legal
regimes that purport to favor national insiders by restricting the rights of
foreign investors. While Kazakhstan and New Zealand are very different
countries with different legal systems, it is helpful to compare these two
protectionist regimes precisely because of their dissimilarities. The
differences highlight what is unique about Kazakhstan’s development, while
also pulling out some common threads in protectionist laws and the factors
leading to their creation. Like Kazakhstan, New Zealand has adopted
protectionist policies uniquely with respect to land, welcoming foreign
investment in other sectors such as finance and manufacturing. 13 New
Zealand is also a multinational country with a history of colonialism and is
facing growing Chinese influence in its economy. 14
This paper argues that Kazakhstan’s proposed ban on foreign ownership
and lease of agricultural land is an uneasy compromise between the
investment-friendly central government and popular, anti-Chinese forces
within the country, keeping foreign business out without providing a
corresponding advantage to domestic agricultural producers. I do not claim
that Kazakhstan or any other country should de-regulate agricultural land,
nor do I attempt to pass judgment on land protectionism per se. If history is
any guide, the power to exclude outsiders is too intertwined with national
sovereignty for land protectionism to be abandoned anytime soon. 15 While
one could criticize land protectionism from an efficiency standpoint, my
critique of Kazakhstan’s system ultimately rests on the observation that
current land regulations prevent or discourage non-citizens and citizens alike
from making necessary investments in Kazakhstan’s farmland. In short, this
paper attempts to identify and organize justifications for land protectionism
in the admittedly “vague, sensational, and largely unsubstantiated” 16 debates
about non-citizen property rights in Kazakhstan and criticizes the law
primarily where it fails to advance citizen welfare.
13 Apart from sizable investments in large companies or telecommunications
infrastructure, only investments in land trigger the Overseas Investment Act. The country has
established offices around the globe to invite investment in New Zealand and educate investors
on opportunities within the country. See Our International Offices, N.Z. TRADE & ENTERPRISE,
https://www.nzte.govt.nz/page/contact-our-international-offices (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
Finance and manufacturing are leading sectors in FDI in New Zealand. Foreign Direct
Investment in New Zealand Continues to Increase, STATS N.Z. (Sept. 25, 2019, 3:45 PM),
https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/foreign-direct-investment-in-new-zealand-continues-toincrease.
14 See infra Part IV. See also Rob Schmitz, Australia and New Zealand Are Ground Zero
for Chinese Influence, NPR.ORG (Oct. 2, 2018 3:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/
627249909/australia-and-new-zealand-are-ground-zero-for-chinese-influence.
15 This issue is explored from the perspective of American constitutional law in Sarah H.
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
16 Grant Wilson, Reforming Alien Agricultural Landownership Restrictions in Corporate
Farming Law States: A Constitutional and Policy View from Iowa, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 709
(2012) (describing alien land laws in farming in the United States).
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In this article, I aim to provide context for understanding Kazakhstan’s
current legal system after over two decades of independent development.
After Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991, several excellent pieces
surveyed Kazakhstan’s new legal system for the English-speaking world.
Alongside the letter of the new law, these articles often sought to discern
Kazakhstan’s until-then-neglected national history and culture. 17 With the
benefit of more data (i.e., years of development to document), recent
commentators have engaged with Kazakhstan’s legal system in action,
examining the role its institutions play in social life. 18 I hope to contribute in
a modest way to this body of scholarship by incorporating the work of other
authors studying land protectionism, typically in the common law context of
alien land laws. Many pieces have bemoaned, analyzed, or cautiously
applauded FDI in land, but fewer have studied the protectionist legal
response to foreign interests in land. 19 I attempt in this paper to apply these
insights into land protectionism to modern Kazakhstan.
This paper is divided into six parts. Part I defines the terms of FDI and
land protectionism. Part II develops three key policy justifications for land
protectionism. Parts III and IV move to surveying the protectionist legal
systems in both countries, summarizing the history and core provisions of
Kazakhstan’s land ban and New Zealand’s 2018 Overseas Investment Act.
Part V compares the policy goals of the two systems and how each system
implements those goals with respect to the type of land covered by the
regulation, the regulated interests in land, and the types of buyers to which
17 E.g., Christopher Osakwe, Anatomy of the 1994 Civil Codes of Russia and Kazakhstan:
A Biopsy of the Economic Constitutions of Two Post-Soviet Republics, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1413 (1998) (summarizing the main provisions of the Russian and Kazakhstani civil
codes in English); Philip M. Nichols, The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani
Reception of A Transplanted Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1235
(1997) (testing the acceptance and integration of the new civil code into Kazakhstani culture).
18 E.g., Lauren Woodard, From Prikaz to Procedures: Becoming an International
Organization in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, 41 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 75
(2018) (exploring one NGO’s navigation of bureaucracy to become an “international
organization”); Margaret Hanson, Legalized Rent-Seeking: Eminent Domain in Kazakhstan,
50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 15 (2017) (observing the institutional source of insecurity of citizen
property rights in Kazakhstan and documenting citizen and official recourse to remedies
through formal legal institutions); Roza Nurgozhayeva, State Ownership in Terms of
Transition: Curse or Blessing, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47 (2017) (arguing that the state
ownership can be efficient in developing economies, testing its hypothesis in the context of
Kazakhstan).
19 Jootaek Lee has compiled an excellent resource on scholarship relating to large-and
smaller-scale land acquisitions in Contemporary Land Grabbing: Research Sources and
Bibliography, 107 LAW LIBR. J. 259 (2015). Alien land laws seem to be a perennial favorite
for student notes; in particular, Grant Wilson compiled numerous resources in Reforming Alien
Agricultural Landownership Restrictions in Corporate Farming Law States, supra note 16.
This paper owes a particular intellectual debt to Professor Tirres’s work in Property Outliers:
Non-Citizens, Property Rights and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77 (2012) in my attempt
to distinguish and explain the different treatment of non-citizens in property law, albeit in a
context outside of the United States.
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the regulations extend. I conclude in Part VI that New Zealand’s protectionist
regime succeeds on its own terms by putting citizen interests first while
directing outside investment to address its national housing shortage.
Kazakhstan’s law, on the other hand, blocks foreign investment and acts as a
disincentive for citizens to invest in agriculture.
I. DEFINITIONS
Before exploring protectionism, we must first define both FDI and land
protectionism. These terms refer to a range of activity that is widespread but
difficult to define.
A. Foreign Direct Investment in Land
FDI has taken many forms according to the variety of incorporated and
unincorporated enterprises around the world. The International Monetary
Fund defines FDI as an “investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest
in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the
investor’s purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the
enterprise.” 20 Investors can be either entities or individuals; this paper will
default to assuming that an “investor” is an entity unless specified otherwise.
In the context of investing in land, a “lasting interest” can be a leasehold,
held either directly by the investor or through a domestic company in which
the foreign investor owns a controlling stake, or the outright purchase of land
in the host country. 21 Land investment is a particularly visible form of FDI:
the investor acquires a physical presence in the foreign country. To receive
the value of the investment, i.e., the use of the land, the investor must control
access to and development of the land to the exclusion of others. This group
of excluded “others” most directly implicates the citizens of the host country,
who live and work in proximity to the foreign-controlled land.
Both developed and emerging countries have sought FDI: emerging
countries tend to seek the financing, expertise, and technology of developed
countries, while developed host countries attract investment by virtue of their
stable and flourishing markets. 22 Former Soviet countries in particular have
sought foreign capital to finance the tremendous structural challenges of
modernizing key industries, such as agriculture and the service sector. 23
Positive accounts of FDI see job creation, the global integration of
economies, and the introduction of modern technology as its primary
20 Tadeusz Galeza & James Chan, Back to Basics, What Is Direct Investment?, 52
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 34 (2015).
21 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN LAND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEUTSCHE
GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT 9 (2009) (surveying types of FDI in land
and defining it as “based on a lasting interest in taking control over land use rights. The
transaction includes either rights of land-use or land-ownership.”).
22 Id. at 34.
23 Id.
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benefits. 24 Foreign investment should, according to this account, create
positive spillover effects for the long-term development of the host country:
more jobs, training, and expertise raise the standard of living for everyone. 25
Competing negative accounts of FDI see foreign capital as threatening the
overall development of the host country when it acts only to strip resources
from that country, exporting goods and profits back home and hiring only
low-skilled labor. FDI in Latin America in the late twentieth century, for
example, “fail[ed] to contribute to the overall long-term economic and social
development of their hosts,” operating as “enclave-type economic islands”
that took advantage of relatively cheap labor to send raw supplies and
produce to other parts of the world. 26 Foreign entities may also destabilize
local markets by out-competing domestic businesses. 27
B. Land Protectionism
Land protectionism (or “protectionism” for short) is the policy of
creating legal barriers to foreign property rights in land. The history of land
protectionism necessarily reflects contemporary norms of what defines an
“insider” as opposed to an “alien.” For example, in the common law tradition,
“[t]he modern ‘citizen’ did not exist . . . in a monarchy, all those owing
allegiance to the king were his subjects.” 28 With narrow exceptions, nonsubjects were not permitted to own or inherit land due to their perceived
allegiance to a foreign sovereign. 29 With the emergence of citizenship as the
marker of insider status in modern nation-states, land protectionism limits
property rights according to citizenship for individuals and entities alike.
Foreign entities present some difficulty in definition, since an entity’s formal
citizenship through incorporation or organization only captures some ways
that non-citizens may be controlling an entity. For example, a majority of
non-citizens may sit on the board of a domestic corporation; a corporation’s
shares may be owned by a controlling majority of non-citizen shareholders;
a foreign corporation may establish a domestic subsidiary. Later sections
about the protectionist frameworks in Kazakhstan and New Zealand will
address how the statutes define foreign-entity ownership. 30
24 Zoltan Adam, FDI: Good or Bad?, 3 SEER: J. LAB. & SOC. AFF. E. EUR. 73, 79–80
(2000). See generally David Shea Bettwy, The Human Rights and Wrongs of Foreign Direct
Investment: Addressing the Need for an Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS.
239 (2012) (summarizing positive and negative aspects of FDI and analyzing its impact on
human rights in the host countries).
25 Adam, supra note 24, at 80–81.
26 Id. at 80.
27 Id. at 73.
28 Allison B. Tirres, Ownership Without Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property
Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 10 (2013).
29 Id. at 10–11. So-called “denizens,” a formal status conferred by the monarch, were
permitted to hold a life estate in land. Id. at 12.
30 See infra Parts III and IV.
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Land protectionism may take several legal forms depending on the
particular goal that the restriction is designed to achieve. Some of the more
common restrictions include: preventing non-citizens from owning land
outright, such as forbidding the sale to or inheritance of land by non-citizens;
limiting lease terms to prevent non-citizens from recreating ownership by
signing, for example, 100-year leases; or preventing non-citizens from
purchasing strategic or otherwise important types of land. 31 The next section
will examine justifications for different forms of land protectionism in more
detail.
II. WHY PROTECT LAND?
Non-citizen control of land implicates core national interests. As
commentators in this field have observed, “citizenship is ‘land’s investment’
. . . ‘[p]atriotism is the demand of the territorial club for priority.’”32 This is
true regardless of how developed the host country’s economy might be. For
example, many American states have alien land laws restricting foreign
investment in real estate. 33 There are several justifications, often overlapping
or mutually reinforcing, that tend to reappear in arguments for land
protectionism. 34 This paper will focus on the recurring concerns of national
security, equity, and national integrity in discussions surrounding land
protectionism.
A. National Security
At its core, the national security critique of foreign land ownership relies
on an assumption that foreign investors stand for the interests of their own
home governments (or other organizations) and should accordingly be
See infra Part II for examples of land-protectionist measures.
Wilson, supra note 16, at 712 (citing Gene Wunderlich, Foreign Investment in U.S.
Real Estate: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S.
REAL ESTATE 347 (Gene Wunderlich, USDA ed., 1976); Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to
Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 27, 1917), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE,
1912-1934, 70 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston, eds., 1996)).
33 See Erin McKinstry, Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting, Regulation on
Foreign
Ownership
of
Agricultural
Land:
A State-by-State
Breakdown,
https://investigatemidwest.org/2017/06/22/regulation-on-foreign-ownership-of-agriculturalland-a-state-by-state-breakdown/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). E.g., “[S]ales of state lands shall
only be made to citizens of the United States and to those who shall have declared their
intentions to become such.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-313 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis.
Sess.).
34 This paper identifies three primary justifications but does not pretend to be exhaustive.
Other authors have framed policy concerns differently in the context of their specific issues.
See, e.g., Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-Farming Measures in A Post-Jones World, 14
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 99–102 (2009) (discussing five normative concerns behind restricting
the corporate form in state agriculture, including “restricting absentee ownership,” lack of
insider “social controls that influence qualifying corporations’ behavior,” and “larger
landholdings” that threaten family farmers).
31
32
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treated as suspect. The English jurist William Blackstone summarized this
fear: “If lands had been suffered to fall into their hands who own no
allegiance to the crown, the design of introducing our feuds, the defence of
the kingdom, would have been defeated.” 35 English common law strictures
against alien land ownership were based on the notion that land ownership
was a privilege deriving from one’s undivided allegiance to a sovereign. 36
The forced removal of Japanese farmers from their land on the West Coast
after Pearl Harbor offers an extreme modern example of security motivated
protectionism. 37
The national security concern is most acute in regulating specific types
of land. For example, foreign citizens and foreign-controlled entities may be
prohibited from purchasing land near a national border or by a city’s water
supply. 38 At a minimum, most countries monitor the levels of foreign
ownership within their territories. 39 Agricultural land occupies a special place
in the national security analysis as countries compete for arable land to secure
their food supply. Responding to a spike in food prices around 2008, food
importing countries such as China and Saudi Arabia began to acquire
interests in farmland in Africa and South America. 40 These investors sought
not only profit, but also represented their national interest in securing
domestic food supply through imports. 41 Agricultural investment can be seen
as a zero-sum game whereby—in the most dramatic framing of the issue—a
foreign country takes food from the mouths of the host country’s citizens. Of
course, this analysis ignores potential benefits to the host country when
investors hire citizens in their operations, and moreover assumes that all food
produced on the investor’s land is exported to the investor’s home country.

35 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 328 (4th ed.
London, V. & R. Stevens and G.S. Norton 1853).
36 Tirres, supra note 28, at 10–11.
37 For a brief legal history of internment, see Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47, 57 (2019). On anti-immigrant and antiJapanese prejudice in the West preceding internment, see generally Robert Higgs, Landless
by Law: Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture to 1941, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 205 (1978).
38 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States takes the targeted approach
by identifying and overseeing transactions connected to “critical infrastructure,” including real
estate. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2020).
39 For example, the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 requires
foreign persons holding interests in U.S. agricultural land to submit a report to that effect to
the Secretary of Agriculture. Pub. L. 95-460, Oct. 14, 1978, 92 Stat. 1263 (7 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.).
40 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN LAND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 21,
at 12–13.
41 See Lee, supra note 19, at 262 (noting that “states seeking guaranteed food production
for their citizens” and transnational corporations have been leading the large-scale acquisition
of land abroad).
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B. Equity
Foreign land ownership also implicates economic inequality or equity
concerns between citizens and non-citizens. Blanket restrictions against
investment or certain types of investment, such as within the agricultural or
housing sectors, may be motivated by equity concerns since the introduction
of foreign capital into a market tends to raise land prices and force local
players out. This dynamic operates even between states in the United States.
The widespread and often ironic slogan “Go back to California” in Oregon,
for example, reflects the wave of demand for real estate from the wealthier
state that resulted in higher property values and taxes for Oregonians. 42 In
certain African countries, foreign landowners have literally displaced local
people from plots where they had been farming on the basis of informal
property rights. 43 Foreign investors may not be familiar with or sympathetic
to customary practices, relying instead on formal property rights to oust
locals interfering with their investment.
Equity concerns are also implicated in the duration of a foreign
investor’s property interest. Landownership—as opposed to leasing—
typically includes the right to convey the property or to pass it to heirs of
one’s choosing, effectively locking citizens out of the foreign-owned
property for generations. In the case of corporate-owned property, the
indefinite longevity of the corporate owner poses a similar issue. 44
C. Nationalism
Finally, the emotional dimension of national integrity underlies land
protectionism and heightens concerns about national security and equity.
Nationalist justifications often dictate the degree of protectionism within a
given legal framework. One might see nationalist statements such as “[t]he
land of a country should belong to the nation and to its citizens” simply as
xenophobia, and prejudice against outsiders certainly plays a role in land
protectionism. 45 There is more, though: land evokes a deep emotional
E.g., Douglas Perry, “Go Back to California!” Graffiti on Car, House Stuns New
Arrivals, Highlights Old Tensions in Portland, THE OREGONIAN OREGONLIVE (July 2, 2017),
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2017/07/go_back_to_california_vandalis.html (“The
beast steals our jobs and our self-respect. It keeps us from buying homes. It is The
Californian.”).
43 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN LAND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note
21, at 9. This can be remedied by including the right by the group in question to use/cross the
land in question in the purchase/lease.
44 One Ohioan expressed this concern: “once a foreign entity buys up however many acres
they want, Americans might never be able to secure that land again.” “American Soil” Is
Increasingly Foreign Owned, NPR.ORG (May 27, 2019 4:17PM) https://www.npr.org/
2019/05/27/723501793/american-soil-is-increasingly-foreign-owned.
45 See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 89, at 3 (1921). This report argued for the exclusion of
Japanese immigrants from property rights in California and other Western states, stating in
dramatic terms that a Japanese influx would amount to “semibarbarism.” Id. at 4.
42
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response and often stands in the popular imagination for the national unit
itself. “The land is not merely a site of beauty, but also a site that ‘addresses’
a people. It not only offers a physical refuge a nation can call its own, but
also provides the ground, so to speak, where the nation can both be reminded
of itself and become itself.” 46
Members of a nation tend to view themselves as the stewards of the
territory they occupy; slogans against foreign ownership play on the theme
that land “belongs” to its citizens, even if they as individuals do not own the
land in a formal, legal sense. 47 Foreign owners who hold land for investment
are therefore perceived as lacking a sense of stewardship and are seen as less
capable of managing the land. This idea echoes throughout discussions of
foreign land rights; one advocate for restricting foreign land rights
summarized it as: “The closer you are to the land, the more likely you are to
take care of it.” 48 At its most extreme, foreign ownership without responsible
management might amount to a type of “neo-colonialism,” whereby a foreign
entity strips the host country’s land with no view to its long-term
cultivation. 49
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN KAZAKHSTAN
A. History of Land Ownership
After surveying land protectionism and its common justifications, I will
now turn to Kazakhstan and its land-protectionist legal regime, past and
present. First, a word about the land itself: Kazakhstan’s territory is made up
of arid and semi-arid steppe, desert, and mountains. Without cultivation,
steppe land is naturally suited as pasturage for animal herding. 50 The
country’s main crop is wheat, grown primarily in Northern Kazakhstan, with
46 Eyal Chowers, Land‐centred Nationalism and the State: A Re‐evaluation of Jewish
National Revival, 24 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 937, 938 (2018). This article will treat the
concept of nationalism broadly and not dive into a deeper study of the specific culturological
dimensions of nationalism in Kazakhstan and New Zealand (land-centered or otherwise).
47 For example, the Russian nationalist slogan “Rossiya dlya russkikh” [“Russia for
Russians”] implies a right to live in the country’s territory based on national identification
rather than property ownership. A more inclusive spin on this metaphorical citizen ownership
can be found in Woody Guthrie’s This Land is Your Land. WOODY GUTHRIE, THIS LAND IS
YOUR LAND (1956), available at https://www.woodyguthrie.org/Lyrics/This_Land.htm.
48 Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting, As Foreign Investment in U.S. Farmland
Grows, Efforts to Ban and Limit the Increase Mount, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (June 6, 2019),
https://www.agriculture.com/farm-management/farm-land/as-foreign-investment-in-usfarmland-grows-efforts-to-ban-and-limit-the.
49 This term is used in the literature discussing FDI in land in developing countries,
particularly in Africa. E.g., Beth Robertson & Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Global Land
Acquisition: Neo-colonialism or Development Opportunity?, 2 FOOD SEC. 271 (2010).
50 Jessica Barkas, Testing the Bomb: Disparate Impacts on Indigenous Peoples in the
American West, the Marshall Islands, and in Kazakhstan, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 29, 44
(2005).
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oilseed (such as flax) and cotton grown in the East and South, respectively. 51
Yields are “highly dependent on weather” due to Kazakhstan’s aridity,
undeveloped irrigation technology, and a Soviet legacy of single-crop
farming. 52 Livestock farming accounts for some 40% of agricultural output. 53
Contemporary Kazakhstan is a presidential republic in which both the
president and parliament may exercise legislative powers. 54 Kazakhstani
citizens today may own land, but the recognition of individual land
ownership rights as a phenomenon separate from political power emerged in
the country relatively recently (with the exception of a brief period between
1906 and the late 1920s).
Before the incorporation of the Kazakh khanates into the Russian
Empire, grazing lands were recognized as the property of feudal lords whose
tribal units were in possession of the land. 55 Paths used by nomadic groups
to travel between pasturelands were common property. 56 After a series of
treaties and alliances begun in 1731, the lands of the Kazakh khans came
fully under the control of the Russian Empire around 1847. 57 Kazakh herders
were permitted to preserve their customary law to self-regulate within the
imperial system. 58 In 1906, in an effort to prevent the socialist radicalization
of its peasant class, Russia recognized the right of all Russian subjects—but
not ethnic Kazakhs—to own land. 59 For good measure, the empire followed
51 Kazakhstan Agricultural Overview, U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Commodity Intelligence
Report, https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2010/01/kaz_19jan2010/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2021).
52 Id.
53 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT , MONITORING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES IN KAZAKHSTAN 15 (2019).
54 Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan (1995 rev. 2017) [Konst. RK] [Constitution] art.
49 para. 1 (vesting legislative power in the parliament); § 3 art. 45 para. 1 (permitting the
president to issue binding decrees).
55 Bakytzhan Abdraimov et al., Istoriko-pravovoi Analiz Razvitiia i Stanovleniia Arendy
za Zemliu v Respublike Kazakhstana [Historical and Legal Analysis of The Development and
Establishment of Land Rent in the Republic of Kazakhstan], 16 IURIDICHESKIIE NAUKI [LEGAL
STUDIES] 249, 250 (2012). For a brief account of early Kazakh culture, see J. Robert Brown,
Jr., Culture, Chaos and Capitalism: Privatization in Kazakhstan, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
909, 911–17 (1998).
56 Abdraimov et al., supra note 55, at 250.
57 Id. (citing as authority for the date of 1847 Zh. K. Taimaganbekov, ISTORIIA
KAZAKHSTANA S DREVNEISHIKH VREMËN DO NASHIKH DNEI [A HISTORY OF KAZAKHSTAN
FROM ANCIENT TIMES UNTIL THE MODERN DAY] (1993)). In 1847 Russia had not yet abolished
serfdom, but the law did recognize private property rights for the nobility and the merchant
classes. RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE OLD REGIME 133–34 (1974).
58 Abdraimov et al., supra note 55, at 250. The Kazakhs were not peasants (krest’iane)
who were bound to land as serfs, and so could observe their own customary laws within the
boundaries of grazing lands not otherwise occupied by Russian military settlements, towns, or
private estates.
59 Ukaz [Decree] of Nov. 9, 1906. A photocopy of the document in original Russian is
available online at https://doc.histrf.ru/20/imennoy-vysochayshiy-ukaz-o-dopolneniinekotorykh-postanovleniy-deystvuyushchego-zakona-kasayushchikh/ (last visited Mar. 8,
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these reforms with a mass resettlement of potentially insurrectionary Russian
peasants onto arable plots of land in Siberia and the Kazakh steppe. 60 One
can compare this privatization of farmland in Kazakhstan to the enclosure
movement in England, whereby customary property rights held in common
by diffuse groups (villagers in England, and nomadic tribes in Kazakhstan)
were displaced by private owners who cultivated or sold the land for profit. 61
Yet unlike England’s centuries of discussing and refining enclosure,
widespread privatization of farmland appeared in Kazakhstan suddenly and
by the fiat of a colonizing power.
After the 1917 Revolution, all title to land was transferred to the Soviet
government, but Soviet citizens continued to exercise formal property rights
within the new socialist regime.62 Individual farmers retained the right to rent
land and largely control its use under the New Economic Policy.63 This
compromise lasted until the late 1920s with the forced collectivization of
farming. Peasant farmers were initially allowed to continue cultivating their
plots as individuals but faced extreme legal and extralegal deterrents,
including heavy taxes, punitive farming assignments by the state, and
confiscation of crops. 64 In the culmination of collectivization in 1928, Soviet
2021).

60 George L. Yaney, The Concept of the Stolypin Land Reform, 23 SLAVIC REV. 275, 278
(1964). Yaney argues that while heading off revolution was certainly a priority for tsarist
officials, the land reforms should be seen as an attempt at structural change more than ad hoc
measure to stave off unrest.
61 See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law,
43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 243–61 (1995) (surveying the historical justifications for enclosure
of common land, including increased investment in the enclosed land by its owners and
resulting increases in agricultural productivity). In contrast to the English enclosure laws, the
Russian land reforms (also called the Stolypin land reforms) were experimental, short-lived,
and led primarily by the state. See generally Yaney, supra note 60.
62 See, e.g., Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Developments in Soviet Property Law, 13
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 446 (1989) (summarizing the evolution of “socialist property” concerning
individual property rights).
63 Daria Verkhoglyad, Novaia Ekonomicheskaia Politika (NEP) i Regulirovaniie Prava
Sobstvennosti na Zemliu v SSSR v Period eë Provedeniia [The New Economic Policy (NEP)
and The Regulation of Property Rights of the Lands in the USSR During the Period of Its
Implementation] 94 NAUCHNYI ZHURNAL KUBGAU [SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL OF THE KUBAN
STATE AGRARIAN UNIVERSITY] 2 (2013). The Soviet Land Code of 1922 protected agricultural
collectives and “guaranteed perpetual use of all land factually being worked to the person at
that time operating the land.” John N. Hazard, Soviet Property Law, 30 CORNELL L. REV. 466,
472 (1945). Non-collectivized farmers were governed not by the Land Code but by the civil
contracts code in their leases with the government. Id.
64 LEWIS SIEGELBAUM & ANDREI SOKOLOV, STALINISM AS A WAY OF LIFE (2000). The
planned economy meant that individual farmers had more independence in theory but had
little control of their output or chosen crops. Ethnic Kazakhs suffered the highest casualties as
a percentage of their population during the famine resulting from forced collectivization in the
1930s. Some historians estimate that around 40% of Kazakhs died during this period. Elena
Volkava, The Kazakh Famine of 1930-33 and the Politics of History in the Post-Soviet Space,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-kazakh-famine-1930-33-and-the-politicshistory-the-post-soviet-space (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
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citizens lost the right to lease farmland until the late 1980s under
perestroika. 65 Until the fall of the Soviet Union, then, title to land remained
in government hands while agricultural collectives had the right to possess
and use farmland as part of their charters. 66 These rights were closely tied to
the specific use planned for the land by the socialist state; “the rights to
possess and use land . . . may be revoked by the local council of people’s
deputies in the case of . . . ‘use of the plot for purposes other than those
designated.’” 67 This model of “socialist ownership” was distinct from
government leases, a practice common in the urban housing sector. 68
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet government implemented the “virgin
lands” program in Kazakhstan, dedicating a large portion of its territory to
growing grain. 69 In an echo of the tsarist-era mass settlements to Kazakhstan,
the program also encouraged large numbers of Soviet citizens, particularly
Russians, to immigrate to the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic to farm
the land; ethnic Kazakhs became a minority within the Republic. 70 The policy
also dealt the final blow to nomadism in Kazakhstan, since traditional grazing
lands were repurposed by the state for wheat production. 71
In 1991 the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan transferred all
territory from Soviet to Kazakhstani state ownership. Independence
presented Kazakhstan with a host of novel challenges, including the
establishment of a new legal system to replace the socialist Soviet codes.
After tremendous and detailed study of code-based and common law
systems, the country adopted its modern Civil Code in 1994 and Constitution
in 1995. 72
B. Agricultural Land in the Civil and Land Codes
Kazakhstan’s Civil Code combines into a single document regulating
private law what traditional civil law systems organize as separate civil and
Andrei A. Baev, The Privatization of Land in Russia: Reforms and Impediments, 17
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 13, 17 (1994). Perestroika (“rebuilding”) was the policy
of economic liberalization, i.e., the introduction of a limited market regime, under Mikhail
Gorbachev that immediately preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union.
66 Soviet citizens could own their own homes as structures, although citizens living in
communal apartments or municipally owned buildings were unable to become owners.
Hazard, supra note 63, at 474–77; Schneider, supra note 62.
67 Schneider, supra note 62, at 465.
68 Hazard, supra note 63, at 476–77.
69 Brown, supra note 55, at 924–25. “Virgin Lands” is the translation of the osvoenie
tseliny program initiated by General Secretary Khrushchev and continued under the leadership
of Leonid Brezhnev.
70 Id.
71 Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption Regime
and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 863,
906–07 (2001).
72 For a summary of the birth of Kazakhstan’s Civil Code, see Osakwe, supra note 17.
65
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commercial codes. 73 The Civil Code also calls for the adoption of
supplementary codes, such as land and securities regulation. Unlike its Soviet
predecessor, the Civil Code recognizes individual private property rights in
land, which are entitled to the same legal protection as state ownership. It
differentiates between ownership of land and ownership of structures built
on land, classifying both as “immovable property.” 74 Individuals are also
permitted to lease land, which is termed by the Civil Code to be a contractual
right, not a property right. 75 The Civil Code presumes that unless stated in
the contract, leases for real property are of indefinite length. 76 However, this
liberal approach is limited in the case of farmland by the Land Code, which
permits citizens and domestic Kazakhstani entities to lease agricultural land
for up to forty-nine years. 77 Perhaps in recognition of the “politically
charged” nature of land ownership in the post-Soviet sphere, the original
Civil Code provisions concerning land were drafted to become effective only
after the adoption of the later-drafted Land Code, which would represent
some consensus about land privatization. 78
If the Civil Code’s general embrace of private land ownership had
aroused little dispute, the nitty-gritty of land privatization in the Land Code
has provoked more controversy. Adopted in 2003—over ten years after
independence—the Land Code has been subject to regular reworkings as the
process of land privatization starts and stops. Continuing the Soviet status
quo, the government first permitted use rights for farmers on state-owned
farmland, then moved to a leasing model in 1995. 79 The 2003 Land Code
recognized private ownership of farmland, but few large agricultural
collectives from the Soviet period were restructured into smaller private
entities. And among the newly privatized, few shareholders exercised their
rights to create independent family farms. 80 One reason for this low interest
in privatization among rural residents was financial: lease rates were low,
only 1% of the value of the land, so continuing to lease from the state was
often the most affordable option. 81
The Land Code defines seven main types of land, something of a
This is modeled in part on the Dutch code system. Osakwe, supra note 17, at 1417.
Grazhdanskii Kodeks Respubliki Kazakhstan [GK RK] [Civil Code] [hereinafter Civil
Code] art. 117 para. 1.
75 Id. arts. 540 et seq.
76 Id. art. 545 para. 2.
77 Land Code art. 37 para. 5(1).
78 Osakwe, supra note 17, at 1482, 1486.
79 Martin Petrick & Richard Pomfret, Agricultural Policies in Kazakhstan, Discussion
Paper No. 155, LEIBNIZ INST. AGRIC. DEV. TRANSITION ECON. 12 (2016).
80 Restructuring and the breakup of large agricultural collectives were thought to endanger
productivity and food security. Id. at 10–12 (“Privatization in principle broke up large farms,
but in practice many farms remained essentially unrestructured. . . . The sector was
characterized by continuing power of former state-farm managers and of local authorities.”).
81 Hanson, supra note 18, at 30–31.
73
74

173

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:159 (2021)

national zoning of territory, each with associated legal regulations. 82
Agricultural land is subject to a different regulatory regime than residential
or industrial land, with the precise allocation of land into any category left to
administrative bodies within the central and municipal governments. 83
Designation depends on how the land is used: agricultural land encompasses
cultivated or arable land as well as the land on which are located the roads,
“bodies of water,” and secondary “constructions and installations” that serve
the agricultural economy. 84 Approximately 272 million hectares, or over
70% of Kazakhstan’s territory, is designated as agricultural land suitable for
growing crops or pasturing livestock. 85
In language reminiscent of the Soviet planned economy, the Land Code
requires the optimal use of farmland, forbidding farmers from building
structures or grazing animals on “valuable arable areas” with the greatest
potential for producing crops. 86 Citizens and domestic entities may purchase
or lease agricultural land. 87 Base rates for leasing state-owned farmland are
set low by statute, as noted above, a form of government subsidy for
agriculture. 88 Government is also the primary source of agricultural credit
through the state holding company KazAgro, which grants loans to projects
and entities according to state-set priority. 89 Shortly before the proposed land
reforms in 2015, only 1.3% of all agricultural land was privately owned. 90
The remaining 98% of farmland was leased by the government to
Kazakhstani farmers or agricultural enterprises. 91 One can contrast this
picture with the robust private market in urban real estate, in which some

Land Code § 1, ch. 1, art. 1.
Id. arts. 2, 8.
84 Id. art. 97 1–2.
85 Economy (Kazakhstan), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_kz.html.
86 Land Code art. 97 3. “By this, the valuable arable areas, which include all kinds of
irrigated arable areas, plowing land, abandoned field and the lands, occupied by the perennial
plantings, may not be used for construction of animal production units, temporary and
domestic structures for the seasonal works and distant-pasture cattle tending on the
agricultural lands.”
87 Id. art. 37 para. 5.
88 N.S. Almukhamedova et al., Zemel’naia Diskussiia: Khronologiia, Soderzhanie, Itogi
[The Land Discussion: Chronology, Content, and Conclusions], KAZAKHSTANSKII INSTITUT
STRATEGICHESKIKH ISLEDOVANII PRI PREZIDENTE RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KAZAKHSTAN
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN]
17 (2016).
89 See Ayapbergen Taubayev et al., Institutional Support of Agro-industrial Complex
Entities of Quasi-public Sector of Kazakhstan, 8 J. ADVANCED RES. L. & ECON. 1350, 1352
(2017) (concluding that the “main purpose of the Holding [company] is implementation of
state policy on forming and development of competitive and export-oriented agriculture”);
Petrick & Pomfret, supra note 79, at 21.
90 Almukhamedova et al., supra note 88, at 14.
91 Id.
82
83
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96% of housing stock was privately owned. 92
As a general principle, the Land Code permits foreign citizens and
entities to own land “on an equal basis with citizens and legal entities of the
Republic of Kazakhstan unless otherwise provided by this Code or other
legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” 93 The Land and Civil Codes
define foreign entities as enterprises incorporated abroad, or domestic entities
in which a foreign entity or citizen owns over half of the authorized capital. 94
Under the terms of the 2016 moratorium—and the 2021 amendment to the
Land Code—the Land Code prohibits the purchase of agricultural land by
Kazakhstani enterprises, Kazakhstani citizens, or foreign-owned
enterprises. 95 Entities with over fifty percent foreign-contributed capital may
not lease agricultural land. In contrast, the Land Code permits the purchase
of residential and industrial land by natural persons and entities—regardless
of national citizenship. 96 Foreign-owned entities may also lease oil and gas
rights, and benefit from government policies encouraging investment in this
sector. 97
Gauging demand by foreign investors to lease or buy farmland in
Kazakhstan is difficult given the low level of privatization and legal bar to
such activity. FDI in agricultural production (as opposed to agricultural food
processing) represented less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s total FDI shortly
before the proposed 2016 reforms. 98 Immediately before the 2016
moratorium, investors from Russia, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates
92 UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, COUNTRY PROFILES ON THE
HOUSING
SECTOR:
REPUBLIC
OF
KAZAKHSTAN
39
tbl.
2
(2018),
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/countries/kazakhstan/07_CP_Kazakh
stan_part1chapter3.ENG.pdf.
93 Land Code art. 6 para. 6.
94 Land Code art. 97 para. 3(6)(3).
95 Land Code art. 24, as amended by O Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopol’nenii v Nekotorye
Zakonodatel’nye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam Zemel’nykh Otnoshenii [An Act
to Change and Amend Several Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Issues of Land
Relations] art. 1(6) (May 13, 2021).
96 Land Code art. 23 para. 4 (“Foreigners, stateless persons and foreign legal entities (nonstate ones) may own land plots for the purposes specified in paragraph 3 of this article, except
for lands intended for agricultural production and afforestation.”).
97 See, e.g., O Nedrakh I Nedropol’zovanii [Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use], arts. 32,
40 (not differentiating between the rights of domestic and foreign entities apart from requiring
that foreign applicants for subsoil licenses submit documents in Kazakh or Russian and
provide certain disclosures related to the laws of the investor’s home country). For a summary
of Kazakhstan’s subsoil regulations for investors, see YERBOLAT YERKEBULANOV ET AL.,
KAZAKHSTAN MINING LAW AND PRACTICE (Chambers Global Practice, 2020). On incentives
to invest, see Kulpash Konyrova, Kazakhstan to Hold Auction for Subsoil Use Rights in
December, NEWEUROPE (Sept. 29, 2020, 3:39 PM), https://www.neweurope.eu/article/
kazakhstan-to-hold-auction-for-subsoil-use-rights-in-december/.
98 WORLD BANK GROUP MACROECONOMICS & FISCAL MANAGEMENT, KAZAKHSTAN THE
ECONOMY HAS BOTTOMED OUT: WHAT IS NEXT? 19 (2017). See infra Part III.C on the
proposed 2016 reforms.
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leased the most farmland, approximately 19,050 total hectares. 99 Chinese
investors were leasing a modest 282 hectares. 100 Note the scale: thousands of
hectares, not thousands or millions. Of Kazakhstan’s 76.5 million hectares of
farmland, then, foreign-controlled entities were leasing some 0.025%. Joint
ventures between Kazakhstani and foreign investors leased an additional
45,000 hectares of land. 101 The Kazakhstani investors owned a sizable share,
around 40%, of such ventures. 102 These figures capture demand when leasing
terms were allowed up to ten years. Suggesting the potential for greater
interest by investors, in 2009 the Kazakhstani government announced a
planned long-term rental project with Chinese partners to grow flax seed in
Northern Kazakhstan for export to Europe. This project was not realized for
reasons unclear, 103 possibly due to low investor interest and the poor quality
of agricultural infrastructure in Kazakhstan in general.104 Proposals to
privatize farmland in 2016 were intended to address both of these problems.
C. 2016 Proposed Reforms to Privatize Agricultural Land
In late 2015, then-President Nazarbayev created a Land Reform
Commission to propose amendments to the Land Code that would improve
agricultural productivity. Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector was and remains
relatively undeveloped. Agriculture comprises a small share of the economy,
around 4.5% of the overall national GDP as of 2019. 105 Kazakhstan’s
economy relies on the oil and gas sector, and growth is closely tied to the rise
and fall of international oil prices. 106 Despite Kazakhstan’s large swaths of
agricultural-zoned land, agriculture is labor-intensive (employing some 18%
of the population), heavily subsidized by government, and produces

99 Skol’ko Gektarov Zemli i v Kakikh Regionakh Kazakhstana Arenduiut Inostrantsy
[How Many Hectares and in Which Regions of Kazakh Are Foreigners Leasing Land],
TODAY.KZ (Apr. 29, 2016, 3:54 PM), https://bit.ly/3t0x1Or.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Kazakhs Protest Alleged Chinese Plan to Rent Farmland, RADIOFREEEUROPE (Dec. 11,
2009, 8:27 PM), https://www.rferl.org/a/Kazakhs_Protest_Alleged_Chinese_Plan_To_
Rent_Farmland/1903278.html#:~:text=Kazakh%20President%20Nursultan%20Nazarbaev
%20told,hectares%20of%20Kazakh%20farm%20land.&text=Nazarbaev%20said%20at%20
the%20foreign,for%20soybean%20and%20rapeseed%20cultivation (“Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbaev told a session of the Foreign Investors Council on December 4 that China
had asked to lease 1 million hectares of Kazakh farm land. But Chinese Ambassador to
Kazakhstan Cheng Guoping said at a press conference on December 9 that he is unaware of
any negotiations between the two countries on this issue.”).
104 See infra Part III.C.
105 Economy (Kazakhstan), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/kazakhstan/#economy (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
106 Total industry, including oil, gas, and mining, comprises 34% of Kazakhstan’s GDP
and around 67% of its total exports. Id.

176

This Must Be Our Place
42:159 (2021)

relatively low yields. 107 Many of these problems can be traced to the Soviet
period, which favored “agriculture . . . dominated by a small number of crops,
which are unsuited to the local environment,” “inefficient nutrient
conservation,” and low investment in technology and infrastructure. 108
Substantial investment was needed to overcome these issues, so the
government tasked the Land Reform Commission with facilitating
investment in agriculture.
The Commission’s proposals centered around the privatization of the
country’s largely state-owned farmland, which was expected to result in
more efficient land use. 109 Under the terms of the proposed amendments,
state-owned land would be sold at auction to domestic and foreign buyers,
with foreign investors permitted to purchase land through a Kazakhstanregistered enterprise 50% or more of whose authorized capital was owned by
Kazakhstani citizens or domestic companies.110 Foreign citizens and entities
with over 50% foreign control were not to be permitted to purchase land.
Rather, these investors would be permitted to lease farmland for up to twentyfive years, an extension from the ten-year lease period permitted for foreign
entities by the Land Code since 2011. 111 Domestic leaseholders would have
the right of first refusal to purchase the plots that they were already leasing.
The amendments would also have removed bureaucratic and legal
restrictions imposed on leasing farmland; leaseholders would be able to sell
and mortgage their rights. 112 The legislative proposals were thus aimed not
only at foreign investors, but would also have given new rights to
Kazakhstani farmers for whom obtaining capital was a chronic difficulty due
to the high-risk nature of farming loans and bank requirements for
collateral. 113 Perpetuating the weak development of Kazakhstan’s
agriculture, farming loans were treated as high-risk precisely because yields
were low and unpredictable—making unavailable the capital that might have
improved productivity through better infrastructure and technology.
The amendments were set to come into effect in July 2016. But once
approved by government, the proposals were met with unprecedented public
disfavor. Activists in the western city of Atyrau set off a wave of mass
protests against the reforms around the country, demonstrating with signs
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 98, at 24.
SANDRA BROKA ET AL., KAZAKHSTAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR RISK ASSESSMENT 10
(2016).
109 Almukhamedova et al., supra note 88, at 15–16.
110 Id. at 18.
111 Id.; Dena Sholk, Kazakhstan’s Land Reforms, DIPLOMAT (June 15, 2016),
https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/kazakhstans-land-reforms/.
112 Almukhamedova et al., supra note 88, at 17–18.
113 Alma Damerovna Karshalova et al., Financing of Agribusiness in Kazakhstan
(National Specifics and International Practice), 38 REVISTA ESPACIOS 23, 24 (2017),
http://www.revistaespacios.com/a17v38n48/a17v38n48p23.pdf; OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS
TO FINANCE IN KAZAKHSTAN’S AGRIBUSINESS SECTOR (2013).
107
108
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bearing slogans like, “Do not sell land to China!” 114 The legislature
responded quickly, enacting in August a five-year moratorium on amending
the Land Code to halt the planned privatization. It also suspended until
December 2021 the right to purchase farmland for either Kazakhstani or
foreign enterprises. The legislature and President spoke of the need for
further study and refinement of land reform, although official sources
explained the protests as stemming from popular ignorance about the
amendments more than disapproval of FDI in land. 115
Nazarbayev stepped down as president in 2019, leaving his successor
Tokayev with the looming prospect of land reform in 2021. In August 2020,
Tokayev preemptively announced in a general government assembly that the
sale of land to foreigners would not be revived as a proposal once the
moratorium expires. 116 The announcement was reported by media as a “ban”
on the sale of land, but the law was formally amended only in May 2021, as
the moratorium approached its expiration date.
In summary, Kazakhstan’s Land Code limits the purchase of
agricultural land by domestic and foreign investors alike, permitting only
entities with less than 50% foreign control to lease land for up to forty-nine
years.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN NEW ZEALAND
With this understanding of Kazakhstan’s legal framework, we now
move to a survey of New Zealand’s protectionist law before comparing the
two systems in Part V. New Zealand has restricted the purchase of land by
foreign citizens and foreign-controlled entities since the mid-1960s. 117 New
Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary supremacy,
allowing the regulation of foreign interests in land to be reworked by act of
parliament several times just in the past five years. The current regulatory
framework is contained in the Overseas Investment Act, enacted first in 2005
and amended in 2018 and 2020. 118
The Act provides for an administrative screening process when a non114 Sanat Urnaliev, Aktivist Prosit ne Prodavat’ Zemliu [Activist Asks Not to Sell Land],
RADIO AZATTYQ, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/isatai-utepov-uralsk-protestrotiv-prodazhi-zemli/
27693817.html (Apr. 24, 2016).
115 E.g., Almukhamedova et al., supra note 88, at 21. Nazarbayev also referred to
“provocateurs” as responsible for some of the unrest. Catherine Putz, Land Protests Persist in
Kazakhstan, DIPLOMAT (May 3, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/land-protestspersist-in-kazakhstan/.
116 Prodazha Zelmi Inostrantsam: Tokaev Prinial Reshenie [Sale of Land to Foreigners:
Tokayev Has Made A Decision], FORBES.KZ (July 10, 2020), https://forbes.kz/process/
budut_li_peredavatsya_kazahstanskie_zemli_inostrantsam/ (“Zemlia ne budet prodavat’sia
inostrantsam. K etomu voprosu my bol’she ne vernemsia.” “Land will not be sold to
foreigners. We will not return to this question again.” (author’s translation)).
117 Amokura Kawharu, The Values at Stake in the Screening of Foreign Investment in
Land: A Legislative History in Three Acts, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 235, 235 (2015).
118 This paper examines New Zealand’s legal regime as of the end of 2020.
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resident or entity with more than 25% foreign ownership or control applies
to purchase “sensitive land.” 119 Sensitive land includes all residential land, as
well as non-urban land acquisitions exceeding five hectares. Land that
adjoins sensitive land for purposes of the statute is also protected. 120 The Act
defines “investment” in land subject to regulation as any interest in sensitive
land or an estate or interest in land that lasts longer than three years. 121 The
Act was further restricted in 2018 to control foreign purchase of housing,
classifying all existing housing as sensitive land. 122
The 2018 amendments were passed in response to New Zealand’s
longstanding housing affordability crisis. In 2017, median house prices in
Auckland were nearly ten times the median annual household income.123
Average rents also climbed, although they were limited in many cases by
tenants’ ability to pay, since rented property tended to be clustered in lowincome urban areas, where Māori citizens disproportionately tend to live. 124
Housing stock was further made scarce by the country’s preference for lowdensity homes; this preference was entrenched by local council (municipal
planning bodies) decisions blocking inclusive or multi-family rezoning. 125
Commentators bemoaned the lack of starter homes and middle-priced units
that might improve social mobility.126
The screening process for acquiring sensitive land requires the potential
investor to apply for approval to the Overseas Investment Office (OIO). The
application must present information for why the proposed purchase will
bring a “benefit to New Zealand,” a multi-factor test under which a potential
investor must present data showing a variety of factors depending on the land
and investment in question, such as whether the investment will: “create[e]
119 Overseas Investment Act 2005, pt 1 s 7(a)–(c) (N.Z.) (defining “overseas person” as an
individual non-citizen or non-resident, and incorporated bodies “incorporated outside New
Zealand or . . . a more than 25% subsidiary of a body corporate incorporated outside New
Zealand,” or a corporate body where overseas persons own “more than 25% of any class of
A’s securities,” “the power to control the composition of more than 25% of A’s governing
body,” or “the right to exercise or control the exercise of more than 25% of the voting power
at a meeting of A”). Section 7 also provides definitions in (d), (e), and (f) of overseas persons
who are unincorporated entities.
120 Id. sch 1 tbl. 1.
121 Id. s 12.
122 Id. sch 1 tbl. 1 (area threshold for residential land is zero hectares, i.e., extends to all
residential land).
123 Michelle Tustin, Legal Interventions to Meaningfully Increase Housing Supply in New
Zealand Cities with Housing Shortages, 48 VICTORIA U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 133, 134
(2017).
124 Bob Hargreaves, More New Zealanders Are Renting, And Renting for Longer. The Rule
Book Needs to Keep Up, https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/20-03-2017/more-new-zealandersare-renting-and-renting-for-longer-the-rule-book-needs-to-keep-up/ (Mar. 20, 2017).
125 Tustin, supra note 123, at 138–39.
126 Id. at 137–38 (“Auckland has failed to provide a variety of housing options in their
developments. Developers are naturally reluctant to build low end housing on extremely
expensive land.”).
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new job opportunities in New Zealand,” “introduce[] into New Zealand . . .
new technology or business skills,” “introduc[e] into New Zealand . . .
additional investment for development purposes.” 127 To purchase housing,
individuals must establish their intent to reside in New Zealand for at least
183 days of the year and to become a resident for tax purposes. 128 There is
good reason to question the effectiveness of this provision in making housing
available for Kiwis: prior to the 2018 amendments, individual investors
accounted only for some three percent of housing purchases. 129 However, it
is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the empirical success of the Act.
The majority of pre-2018 foreign investors were Chinese citizens seeking to
study or retire in New Zealand. Foreign-buyer transactions were concentrated
in Queenstown and Auckland, where “almost 5% of the home transfers were
entered into by people without New Zealand citizenship or residency” at their
peak before the 2018 amendment. 130 Since the adoption of the amendments,
home transfers to foreign citizens dropped to around 0.5%, or 153 transfers
per quarter. 131
In recognition of the housing shortage, the 2018 amendments also
attempt to channel FDI to increase the number of residential units available.
Foreign developers may receive more favorable legal treatment under the
“increased housing” test. 132 The OIO’s website explains that this test was
designed to permit foreign investors to “buy residential land in New Zealand
if [the investor] intend[s] to build on it to increase housing supply, but not
live in it.” 133
The OIO tends to spend about a month processing applications,
although requests for additional information from the applicant can further
delay approval. 134 The OIO rarely declines to grant its consent to
investments, with just nine total applications declined from 2018–2019
compared to 416 approvals. 135 However, as the Office itself notes in
Overseas Investment Act 2005 s 17 (N.Z.).
Overseas Investment Act 2018 sch 2 pts 2, 3 (N.Z.).
129 Tran Bao Cao, Foreign Investment in New Zealand Residential Property, 25
COMPARATIVE L.J. PAC. 129, 131 (2019).
130 Id. at 130–31.
131 More Overseas People Selling Than Buying Homes, STATS NZ TATAURANGA
AOTEAROA (Apr. 30, 2020 3:45PM) https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/more-overseas-peopleselling-than-buying-homes.
132 Overseas Investment Act 2018 sch 2 pt 2, s 5 (N.Z.).
133 Information
for
Increased
Housing,
LAND
INFO.
N.Z.,
https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/developing-or-investing-residentialland/information-for-increasing-housing (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
134 Assessment Timeframes, LAND INFO. N.Z., https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseasinvestment/applying-for-consent-purchase-new-zealand-assets/how-oio-assesses-yourapplication/assessment-timeframes (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
135 Decision Summaries - December 2019, Applications Declined, LAND INFO. N.Z.,
https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decision-summaries-statistics/2019-12
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2021).
127
128
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publishing this data, the high cost of fees, professional services needed to
craft a successful application, and pre-application checks mean that
applicants “do not normally submit applications . . . if they are unlikely to
meet the criteria” of the statute.136
V. COMPARISON OF LEGAL REGIMES
We can now compare the respective approaches of Kazakhstan and New
Zealand to implementing land protectionism. Both countries employ the
same essential strategy in implementing their relative protectionist land
regimes. The law, in theory, protects land supply for citizens by preventing
foreign citizens or investors from entering the market. This suppresses land
prices by keeping demand out, particularly demand by capital-rich investors.
This section will analyze the most salient points of comparison and
potential justifications for each type of restriction in view of the policy and
legislative history discussed above. In particular, I attempt to compare the
systems as a whole by analyzing how the legal regimes regulate different
types of land, what interests in land they cover, and which buyers of those
interests are subject to the regulation. In so doing, this section will identify
the underlying policy goal of each system. Overall, New Zealand’s system
presents a relatively balanced protectionist program insofar as it recognizes
a range of sensitive land where national interests are implicated, while also
giving government the ability to screen FDI on a case-by-case basis. New
Zealand’s OIO can protect the interests of local players while still allowing
the country to receive some of the benefits of FDI where they are most
needed. Kazakhstan’s Land Code, on the other hand, shows its origins as a
single-issue compromise in its focus solely on agricultural land and blanket
ban on its purchase.
A. Type of Land
Kazakhstan imposes a flat ban on the purchase or lease of agricultural
land by foreign investors but does not impose a similar restriction on other
types of land. Citizens and non-citizens alike in Kazakhstan may buy
apartments, license the rights to extract oil and gas, and lease industrial-zoned
land. As seen in Part III, this treatment is based not on any calculation of the
relative national interests at stake in farmland as opposed to housing. Rather,
the protectionist moratorium was enacted as a concession to protests
precisely when the government was attempting to make the legal treatment
of farmland consistent with the more privatized and investor-friendly spheres
of mining, housing, and industry. One may contrast this approach with New
Zealand’s catalog of sensitive land, which recognizes a range of areas the
country has an interest in protecting. Existing housing is an exceptional
protected category in that any purchase triggers the application of the “benefit
136
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to New Zealand” test. But even here New Zealand does not impose a flat ban
on foreign purchase of housing, tempering its restriction with the “increased
housing” test.
National security interests often underlie land-type-based protectionist
measures. New Zealand’s housing discussion featured national security—
and openly anti-Chinese sentiments—less virulently than in Kazakhstan,
which may be partly attributable to the fact that New Zealand does not share
a border with China, making an annexation or invasion by the Chinese state
seem unlikely. Moreover, New Zealand’s investors tended to be individuals
seeking a connection with the country for personal reasons like work or
retirement, unlike larger Chinese business investors receiving state
support. 137 While national security interests are doubtless implicated when
foreign entities invest specifically in farmland, 138 Kazakhstan’s single and
blunt exception in banning the sale of agricultural land makes little sense
even from the viewpoint of national security. In the popular discourse,
foreign and particularly Chinese cultivation of the land was equated to
foreign occupation. Kazakhstani activist Isatai Utepov demonstrated in
Atyrau with his well-publicized anti-Chinese slogan. 139 Another protester
argued that, “We can’t give land to the Chinese. If they come then they won’t
leave!” 140 Yet if occupation of the land posed a threat, then the occupation of
industrial or residential land would also logically impair sovereignty in
allowing foreign investors to monopolize Kazakhstani resources for extended
periods of time. In fact, given Kazakhstan’s reliance on industry as measured
by percentage of GDP, investors’ foreign agendas would seem to present
137 Under China’s “go global” policy, state-owned enterprises play a dominant role in the
country’s outward FDI. The state also provides “guidance and intelligence” to state- and
privately owned enterprises engaged in FDI abroad. Ana Teresa Tavares Lehmann &
Frederick Lehmann, Outward Direct Investment by Chinese State-owned Enterprises, 27
COMPETITIVENESS REV. 231, 235 (2017).
138 See supra Part II.A.
139 “Do not sell land to China!” Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained, BBC.COM
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36163103.
140 Id. It is easy to dismiss national security fears as paranoia, but there is some basis for
concern about Chinese investment, particularly for Kazakhstan. Underlying the nationalsecurity concern is a concern that foreign investors represent a foreign government. The
Chinese national government has been implicated in seemingly innocuous technologies sold
by manufacturers, although security concerns like the ones raised by Huawei’s network
devices only came to light after Kazakhstan and New Zealand adopted their protectionist
policies in 2016 and 2018, respectively. The Chinese government has suppressed ethnic
Uyghurs in Western China, some of whom are Kazakhstani nationals and who, as Turkic and
majority-Muslim peoples, have a similar language, culture, and shared history with Kazakhs.
See Bruce Pannier, Why Are Central Asian Countries Silent About China’s Uyghurs?,
RADIOFREEEUROPE (Sept. 22, 2020 4:38PM), https://www.rferl.org/a/why-are-central-asiancountries-silent-about-china-s-uyghurs-/30852452.html; Reid Standish, “Our Government
Doesn’t Want to Spoil Relations with China,” ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/09/china-xinjiang-uighurkazakhstan/597106/. Kazakhstanis might well question the consequences of a Chinese
presence within their borders.
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more of a threat in industry rather than on undeveloped farmland. But the law
permits long-term leasing and construction on industrial land by foreign
investors.
One might argue that like New Zealand’s channeling of FDI to
increased housing construction, Kazakhstan’s law is simply directing
investment to favored projects in the oil and gas sector. This is true. However,
Kazakhstan’s moratorium directs capital too far afield, creating no incentive
for domestic or foreign investors to improve the low yields or poor
infrastructure in agriculture. The moratorium overprotects agriculture while
other laws and policies invite foreign investors into strategically significant
economic sectors.
B. Leases
Both Kazakhstan and New Zealand protect against long-term leasing as
a form of foreign control. Kazakhstan permits only domestic citizens and
entities to obtain leases in farmland. New Zealand allows foreign investors
leasing property for less than three years to bypass the “benefit to New
Zealand test” across the board—i.e., with respect to all types of sensitive
land. The length of the lease—as well as the type of land—implicates
national interests in New Zealand’s scheme. This was the case in Kazakhstan
from 2011 until the moratorium, with foreign-controlled entities permitted to
lease land for up to ten years.
The Kazakhstani protesters highlighted the equity concern that they saw
as inherent in allowing wealthier foreign investors to cultivate land, namely
that the land would be effectively alienated from Kazakhstani citizens: “After
25 years, they will stay for 65. After 65 their descendants will take
Kazakhstan’s citizenship and our descendants will be their slaves.” 141 While
official government accounts of the protests emphasized that the protesters
opposed the law because they did not understand its provisions, 142 the
comment above is interesting because it correctly notes the extended lease
period and objects to it on its own terms. The reason is likely rooted in a
distrust of government justified by experience. When Kazakhstan privatized
land en masse in the 1990s, the population saw that the process favored elites
who obtained private property at bargain prices through corruption and fraud,
entrenching inequality. 143 This experience raises grave procedural concerns
about fairly implementing further agricultural privatization. Yet blocking
privatization altogether, as the moratorium does, forces Kazakhstani citizens
to forego the potential benefits of landownership and FDI, such as increased
productivity, improved infrastructure, and greater tax revenues.
Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained, supra note 139.
Sale of farmland to foreign citizens or entities was never part of the proposed
amendments. See supra Part III.B.
143 Philip M. Nichols, Creating A Market Along the Silk Road: A Comparison of
Privatization Techniques in Central Asia, N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 299, 312–20 (1997).
141
142

183

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:159 (2021)

Kazakhstan’s law also fails from the perspective of advancing citizen
equity. Protectionist laws aim to favor insiders at the expense of outsiders.
When the law prevents foreign investors from entering a market, it is
counterproductive also to restrict citizens’ ability to participate in that
market. This is how Kazakhstan’s current law works: Kazakhstani farmers
may not purchase land, or mortgage or sublet their current leases. By
delaying the auction process envisioned by the 2016 amendments,
Kazakhstani citizens are also deprived of a transparent way of purchasing
land that might counteract government corruption. 144 New Zealand’s Act
affects only the rights of foreign investors with respect to leases, and so does
not suffer from the defect of Kazakhstan’s moratorium in limiting citizen
property rights. The law protects Kiwis from the greater ability of foreign
investors to out-compete them for real estate. Once again, then, Kazakhstani
law over-protects land without protecting or advancing citizen property
interests.
C. Absolute Nature of Protection
Kazakhstan’s Land Code is unambiguous in its degree of protectionism:
purchasing or leasing farmland is forbidden to foreign investors. New
Zealand’s scheme offers the government greater flexibility and discretion to
select which investors and projects are allowed into the country. The
Parliament can also easily amend the Act through parliamentary supremacy,
for example classifying all residential land as “sensitive” in 2018 or
introducing emergency pandemic-related measures in 2020. 145
Nationalism, and specifically protection for national identity, emerges
as the dominant justification for Kazakhstan’s ban. The measure was passed
as a compromise with popular nationalist forces after the uniquely emotional
dimension of farmland ignited a spark in civil society. The 2016 protests were
unprecedented for this undemocratic country where public opposition to
government carries the threat of arrest. Simple ignorance about the proposed
law does not explain fully the scale or intensity of the land protests. The Civil
Code tacitly recognized the tremendous and emotional task of privatizing
land after seventy years of socialism in delaying the process until enough
The stated goal of the auction system was greater transparency, although this by no
means guaranteed it. Abuse of the auction system during privatization throughout the former
Soviet Union through fraud, rigging, and simple intimidation is well documented. See Scott
P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for U.S. and
International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1999, 2000 n.8 (1996) (noting that due to an
alliance between Russian government and mafia, “70% of the privatization auctions were
shams where the buyer was selected well in advance.”). Organized crime in Kazakhstan has
not been thoroughly studied, but there seems to be reason for concern over its influence in
privatization. See Bakhyt Moldatjaevich Nurgaliyev et al., Organized Crime in Kazakhstan:
The Past, the Present, Development Tendencies and Social Consequences, 14 J. APPLIED SCI.
3436 (2014).
145 See generally Overseas Investment (Urgent Measures) Amendment Act 2020 (N.Z.).
144
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consensus had built around the Land Code. The possibility of foreign
influence in this process raised the stakes by threatening Kazakhstan’s
newfound national and cultural identity.
Kazakhstan is a relatively new nation on the world stage. As discussed
above, its territory was first held by tribal units, later becoming a territory of
the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union. 146 Its modern status as a
nation-state was the result more of circumstance than choice. In 1991,
Kazakhstanis would gladly have remained within the Soviet Union had it not
collapsed from under them. 147 The fact that the country is currently a Kazakh
nation-state is also a result of Soviet leadership, which despite its own
nominal dedication to a nationless society chose to organize its republics
along ethnic lines. Modern Kazakhstan is multicultural and multilingual, but
increasingly Kazakh in its commitments. 148 The language of law and
government is Kazakh; the government has announced its departure from
writing Kazakh in Cyrillic script, switching to Roman letters that would make
the language look more like Turkish, its linguistic relative.149 Yet this
national hegemony is fragile. Ethnic Kazakhs only came to represent a
majority of the population in the late 1990s. Before, the waves of Russian
settlers from the Russian Empire and Soviet Union during the Virgin Lands
agricultural resettlement outnumbered Kazakhs. 150 A potential influx of
Chinese agricultural investors, coming from a country whose population
dwarfs that of Kazakhstan, resurrects the possibility that Kazakhs may again
become an ethnic and cultural minority. The popular call to stop Chinese
investors from buying Kazakhstan may plausibly stand for a move to protect
not only the Kazakh economy, but also the new Kazakh national identity.
Nationalism was no less at play in New Zealand’s 2018 housing
amendments, although national pride, more than national fragility, sounded
the dominant note. The introduction of the Overseas Investment Act itself
reads as a kind of nationalist slogan, stating that, “The purpose of this Act is
to acknowledge that it is a privilege for overseas persons to own or control
sensitive New Zealand assets.” 151 Unlike Kazakhstan’s concern with ethnicgroup control over land, New Zealand’s priority was the rights and privileges
of national citizens, who as stakeholders were assumed to be the rightful and
See supra Part III.
See LUCA ANCESCHI, ANALYSING KAZAKHSTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: REGIME NEOEURASIANISM IN THE NAZARBAEV ERA 10–22 (2020) (documenting Kazakhstan’s early efforts
to remain integrated with Russia and the pre-independence order).
148 Aziz Burkhanov, Kazakhstan’s National Identity-Building Policy: Soviet Legacy, State
Efforts, and Societal Reactions, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2017) (noting that “Kazakhs
started to be seen as bearing responsibility for the state and for all other ethnic groups” in their
role as the titular nation of Kazakhstan).
149 Andrew Higgins, Kazakhstan Cheers New Alphabet, Except for All Those Apostrophes,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/world/asia/kazakhstanalphabet-nursultan-nazarbayev.html.
150 Brown, supra note 55, at 924–25.
151 Overseas Investment Act 2005, pt. 1 § 3 (“Purpose”) (N.Z.).
146
147
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better owners of the land. Foreign ownership of real estate was characterized
as speculation, with non-resident and non-residing (Chinese) owners driving
up prices on investment properties and then leaving houses empty. The
indigenous Māori people objected on unique grounds to the sale of land; their
culture treats land as the soul of their people. 152 Selling land to outsiders for
investment or development is diametrically opposed to this belief.
In both countries, then, the law advanced national and nationalist values.
In Kazakhstan, this seems to have been the law’s sole motivation and effect,
while New Zealand attempted to complement protectionism with an option
to channel FDI to increasing the country’s housing stock.
VI. EVALUATING LAND PROTECTIONISM IN KAZAKHSTAN
The previous section suggests that Kazakhstan’s moratorium and
subsequent ban were more emotionally motivated than logically planned. I
conclude in this section that Kazakhstan’s protectionist system fails to
advance the purported goal of protectionism—citizen welfare—while
depriving itself of any benefit of FDI in farmland. As discussed in the
Introduction, defining the “success” of a protectionist system in terms of
empirical efficiency such as increased output, higher wages, etc. is beyond
the scope of this paper. Rather, I evaluate Kazakhstan’s moratorium in view
of its underlying goal. Since the moratorium was enacted to stave off local
opposition, the ensuing social quiet—lack of protests—might be considered
an unqualified success. But on a deeper level, no one, government or
oppositionists alike, has achieved their goal through the protectionist
moratorium. Government has been frustrated in privatizing land and raising
productivity; citizens are unable to become true owners and cultivators of the
land. The ban fails to allow the creation of property rights that might
incentivize local investment in agriculture. As a result, Kazakhstan’s
agricultural lands lie as undeveloped as ever.
Property rights are vital to economic efficiency as rights-holders enjoy
“information and incentives that stimulate entrepreneurship, capital
accumulation, and investment.” 153 For a country to realize these benefits,
property rights must also be secure as legal or political uncertainty can create
transaction costs. 154 Kazakhstan’s law, in codifying the moratorium without
giving citizens additional rights, fails to empower leaseholders from enjoying
increased rights under the 2016 legislative proposals, such as the ability to
transfer their leases. Making agriculture and property rights more precarious
for Kazakhstani citizens, government has the power to take back lands that
Kawharu, supra note 117, at 251.
Claudia R. Williamson, The Two Sides of de Soto: Property Rights, Land Titling, and
Development, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, 95,
96–97 (2010).
154 Id. at 97 (aggregating empirical studies establishing a positive correlation between
secure property rights and economic growth).
152
153
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are “underused” through eminent domain. At the same time Tokayev
announced in 2020 the “ban” on selling farmland to foreigners, he stressed
that the government would be more vigorous in policing land use through
eminent domain than before. 155 Tokayev’s policy is a disincentive for
citizens and foreign businesses alike to avoid farming in Kazakhstan for fear
of the arbitrary and punitive exercise of state power. New Zealand offers a
better model in providing an incentive for foreign investment to target its
housing shortage. While building more housing units alone might not solve
the affordability crisis, New Zealand’s law at a minimum is not acting to
block investment where it is most needed. 156
And while New Zealand suffers from housing scarcity, Kazakhstan
contains millions of underdeveloped hectares of agricultural land. In the face
of such abundance, it is hard to argue that allowing foreign investment,
particularly in such a modest form as partial ownership of a local venture,
would greatly disadvantage citizens. After all, demand for Kazakhstan’s
agricultural land by foreign investors was low in 2016. 157 The ability for
foreign investors to lease land in low demand for an even longer period would
likely not have changed this situation. The primary beneficiaries of the
privatization program, rather, would have been the Kazakhstani farmers then
leasing the land, who would have been able to access financing through their
increased rights under the proposed law. This capital could have been
invested in yield-improving technology. The ban prevents Kazakhstan’s
agricultural enterprises from obtaining capital, had they been able to
purchase land at all.
In short, Kazakhstan’s 2016 moratorium and subsequent 2021 Land
Code amendment are a political concession to concerns about national
integrity that did not adequately account for the potential benefits of
privatization and foreign investment for Kazakhstan’s citizens. The law
blocks FDI in land without providing a corresponding advantage to domestic
entities, serving as a stopgap measure to quell popular protests.
CONCLUSION
The privatization of farmland in Kazakhstan and the introduction of FDI
to this sector has been stymied by nationalist and anti-Chinese forces,
representing everything from a critique of government administration to fears
of Chinese influence on the less populous Kazakh nation. Some of these fears
155 Tokayev Obeshchal Zakryt’ Vopros Prodazhi Zemel’ Inostrantsam [Tokayev Has
Promised to Close the Question of Selling Land to Foreigners], https://tengrinews.kz/
kazakhstan_news/tokaev-obeschal-zakryit-vopros-prodaji-zemel-inostrantsam-407875/ (July
10, 2020, 1:45 PM).
156 New Zealand has also begun to experiment with direct subsidies to families for housing,
although this program has only had, thus far, very moderate success. Yvette McCullough,
First Phase of $400M Housing Fund Announced, https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/
421920/first-phase-of-400m-housing-fund-announced (July 24, 2020, 7:27PM).
157 See supra Part III.
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are grounded in real lived experience, and it bears repeating that concern
about Chinese influence is not a uniquely Kazakhstani phenomenon. As
recent as 2017, Iowa enacted restrictions on foreign acquisition of public
farmland in response to a large Chinese project. 158 However, in light of the
low development of Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector and its need for further
privatization and investment, I question whether blanket protectionism for
farmland is the right approach. Of course, FDI is not the sole solution to
modernizing Kazakhstan’s economy, although land privatization might curb
endemic problems like government corruption by empowering the private
sector. 159
Finally, I should note that Kazakhstan’s laws do not bar the way for FDI
in the agricultural sector altogether. Secondary markets within agribusiness
are open to foreign investment under current law. Food processing,
equipment, and food retail do not fall within the terms of the moratorium and
foreign interest—and capital—might stimulate improvements in this sector.
Investors can likely count on a warmer welcome and more favorable legal
regime in agribusiness, particularly given the state investment company’s
recent promotion of food processing partnerships. 160
Kazakhstan is a beautiful country rich not only in resources like oil and
gas but also human capital. In the nineteenth century, the Kazakh poet Abai
noted that learning the Russian language would be valuable to the Kazakh
people as a way of “opening [their] eyes” to the world. 161 My hope is that the
law in Kazakhstan can analogously facilitate the opening of the economy to
the benefits of FDI from the West and East alike, while allowing the
Kazakhstani people to exercise their sovereignty to channel foreign capital
where it is most needed. For now, however, the lands of the steppe have
defied taming by the state and investors alike.
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